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we make (a component of) labour productivity endogenous and analyze how the presence 
of a stringent protection legislation affects labour market in an equilibrium matching 
model  with  endogenous  job  destruction.  Indeed,  considering  labour  productivity  an 
endogenous could be important not only in the case of EPL, but also for all kind of 
personnel policy evaluation. In this framework high labour productivity on one hand is 
costly in terms of effort, on the other hand is beneficial in terms of lower job destruction. 
We find that high firing costs partially substitute high labour productivity in reducing job 
destruction  and  this,  consequently,  brings  down  the  optimal  level  of  productivity. 
Moreover, the impact of EPL on unemployment is ambiguous but numerical exercises 
show  unambiguously  how  higher  firing  restrictions  reduce  different  measures  of 
aggregate welfare. To some extent, the clear emergence of these results is full of policy 
implication and, indeed, rationalizes the recent empirical evidence on the impact of EPL.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent empirical evidence from European countries and the U.S. shows that the presence of 
stringent  employment  protection  legislation  (EPL)  affects  significantly  the  level  of 
productivity.  In  particular,  both  cross-country  (DeFreitas  and  Marshall,  1998),  Dif-in-Dif 
(Micco and Pages, 2006; Autor et al., 2006, 2007; Bassanini and Venn, 2007; Bassanini et al., 
2009; Lisi, 2009) and other studies (Riphahn, 2004; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) found that a 
higher EPL have a negative impact on labour productivity. 
Nonetheless, the theoretical analysis of the impact of EPL focused mainly on unemployment 
and job flows, disregarding the effects on labour productivity. In fact, both standard analysis of 
labour demand under uncertainty (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and 
Saint-Paul,  1992;  Bentolila  and  Dolado,  1994;  Boeri  and  Garibaldi,  2007)  and  general 
equilibrium models (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 1999b; Garibaldi, 1998; Pissarides, 2000; 
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002) consider the level of productivity an exogenous parameter, not 
influenced by the presence of firing costs. Indeed, the issue has been already the object of 
interest  of  some  papers.  However,  these  studies  analyze  the  role  of  EPL  in  distorting  the 
adjustment of employment and investment and, in turn, productivity growth (Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1997, 2002; Bartelsman and Hinloopen, 2005).    
In this paper, in the spirit of Ichino and Riphahn (2005), we concentrate more on the behavioral 
component  of  productivity,  therefore  we  make  (a  component  of)  labour  productivity  an 
endogenous object of the model and then study the impact of a stringent protection legislation. 
Since our concern is to understand the equilibrium impact on productivity, unemployment and 
welfare, we need to embed the analysis into an equilibrium model of the labour market. To this 
extent, it is our conviction that the Mortensen and Pissarides matching approach to equilibrium 
unemployment is the best candidate for this kind of analysis.  3 
 
In this framework, the matching between any single job vacancy and unemployed worker is a 
costly and sticky process, governed by a matching function assumed with constant returns. The 
job  productivity  has  a  common  component  and  an  idiosyncratic  component,  due  to  either 
demand or technology shocks, which makes the value of product job-specific. The idiosyncratic 
component follows a jump process characterized by a Poisson arrival frequency and it is drawn 
by a common price distribution whenever it jumps.  
The usual assumption in the literature is that technology is fully flexible at the beginning of 
creation, but investment is irreversible. Therefore, at the moment of creation firms choose the 
most profitable job in the market, with the idiosyncratic component at the upper support of the 
price  distribution.  Thus,  every  new  match  generates  a  positive  surplus,  which  is  divided 
between wages and profits according to bilateral bargain. However, whenever a shock arrives 
an existing job cannot be switched to one more profitable and wages are revised in the face of 
new productivity. Nonetheless, large negative shocks generate a negative surplus, which makes 
optimal for a firm  to  destroy the job.  In the presence of a stringent  protection legislation, 
modeled as firing costs, job destruction is costly for the firm. Moreover, there exist a zero-
profit condition for the opening of new vacancies, which determines the tightness of the market 
and, along with the destruction rule, the level of unemployment.  
In this paper we imagine that an employed worker has to  exert effort to produce and this 
generates  disutility.  Following  this  argument,  we  assume  that  the  common  component  of 
productivity is determined by the level of effort exerted by workers. Therefore, high labour 
productivity on one hand is costly in terms of effort, on the other hand is beneficial in terms of 
lower job destruction. This is, as far as we are aware, a novelty as the common component of 
productivity is usually considered an exogenous parameter of the model, not influenced by the 
level  of  institutional  variables.  In  the  light  of  the  micro-founded  nature  of  the  matching 
approach to equilibrium unemployment, this extension could be a good suggestion to  capture 
in the framework the recent evidence on the impact of EPL on productivity. Moreover, the 
approach to put labour market outcomes and personnel economics together when we address 
policy questions has already turned out to be successful (see e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  
An equilibrium is a job destruction and job creation rule, a labour productivity and a level of 
unemployment implied by the rational expectations behavior of individual firms and workers 
and  by  the  matching  technology.  We  study  how  the  presence  of  a  stringent  protection 
legislation affects productivity, unemployment and welfare in the aggregate steady-state. We 4 
 
find  that  high  firing  costs  partially  substitute  high  labour  productivity  in  reducing  job 
destruction and this, consequently, brings down the equilibrium labour productivity. Moreover, 
the  impact  of  EPL  on  unemployment  is  ambiguous  but  numerical  exercises  show 
unambiguously how higher firing restrictions reduce different measures of aggregate welfare. 
To some extent, the clear emergence of these results is full of policy implication and, indeed, 
rationalizes the recent empirical evidence on the impact of EPL. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe the basic theoretical framework and in 
Section 3 characterize its steady-state. Section 4 studies qualitatively the impact of a stringent 
protection  legislation  on  the  equilibrium  level.  In  Section  5  we  conduct  some  numerical 
exercise to study the effect on productivity, but also on different measure of aggregate welfare. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
The basic theoretical framework is the matching approach to equilibrium unemployment with 
endogenous job destruction, in the version of Pissarides (2000). In this economy there is an 
endogenously sized continuum of jobs, characterized by a common component of productivity 
p and an idiosyncratic component x. Each product commands in the market a price of px, which 
evidently differ to each other for the presence of the idiosyncratic component. In the standard 
versions of the model p is considered an exogenous parameter, capturing the macro events that 
affect productivity in all jobs by the same amount and in the same direction. Differently, in our 
interpretation p is the endogenous labour productivity and x is the idiosyncratic condition in the 
market,  due  to  demand  or  technology.  Therefore,  in  our  model  we  do  not  consider  p  a 
parameter capturing the macro shocks, because our aim is exactly to study how firing costs 
affect the level of the behavioural component of productivity. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
there is no difficulty in introducing such a parameter in our model.  
The stochastic process governing the idiosyncratic component x is Poisson with arrival rate λ. 
Whenever a jump arrives, the new level of x is drawn from the distribution G(x) with finite 
upper support    and no mass point. The Poisson process implies that shocks are persistent, but 
conditional on change the new draws are independent by the initial level of x. 
Each firm has only one job that can be either filled and producing some good (state J(x)), 
according to the idiosyncratic level and the behavioural productivity, or vacant and searching 5 
 
for  a  worker  (state  V),  which  costs  pc  per  unit  of  time.  Firms  have  full  information  on 
technology and market condition, therefore they create always the most profitable job, that is, 
with the idiosyncratic level at the upper support of the price distribution. Furthermore, the Nash 
bargaining rule implies that new jobs offer the highest wage as well. However, investment are 
irreversible and when a shock arrives firms have no choice over their productivity. Filled jobs 
not  always  resist  to  negative  productivity  shocks  and,  in  particular,  they  are  destroyed 
whenever the new draw of x falls below a certain level of reservation productivity R. This 
implies that each job has a probability of being destroyed equal to λG(R). Job destruction is not 
costless, rather whenever a job is destroyed firm has to pay the firing costs pF. 
Respectively, each worker can be in one of two states, employed and producing some good 
(state W(x)) or unemployed and searching for a job (state U). Employed worker receives the 
wage w(x) and has to choose how much effort e to exert in the job, which determines the 
common component of productivity p = f(e). Even if not necessary, we assume a linear relation 
p = e between effort and productivity
1. On the contrary, unemployed worker does not exert 
effort and benefits only from z, which can be interpreted either as unemployment compensation 
or as leisure. Wages are the outcome of the Nash bargaining, according to which workers 
receive a fraction 0 < β < 1of the match surplus, where β can be interpreted as the workers‟ 
bargaining power. Since the match surplus is conditional on idiosyncratic productivity, wages 
are revised whenever a productivity shock occurs. In particular, it is intuitive that both match 
surplus and wage are increasing function of x. Following the previous literature, we assume that 
workers  are  risk  neutral  and  impatient,  which  implies  zero  saving  and  full  consumption. 
Furthermore, exerting effort generates an increasing disutility. Therefore, an employed worker 
enjoys conditional on x the instantaneous utility  
              
 
    , 
where γ is the parameter governing marginal disutility of effort (see e.g. Garibaldi, 2006), 
whereas the instantaneous utility of the unemployed worker is simply 
     . 
The number of matches between vacant  jobs  and unemployed workers  is  governed by the 
matching  function  m(v,  u), where  v  and u are  respectively the  number  of vacant  jobs  and 
                                                           
1 Notice that this specification is without loss of generality, given that for the utility function below an additional parameter 
on the relation p = φe would not be identified, but only 
 
   would be identified. 6 
 
unemployed workers. Labour force is normalized to 1, so that in this economy the number of 
unemployed workers u is the unemployment rate. As standard in the literature, we assume that 
the matching function is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in both its 
arguments and homogeneous of degree one, with elasticity strictly between 0 < ξ < 1. By linear 
homogeneity, the transition rate from vacant to filled job is m(v, u)/v = m(1, u/v) = q(θ), with 
q’(θ) < 0, where θ = v/u identifies the labour market tightness. Moreover, the elasticity of q(θ) 
is strictly between –1 < η < 0 and it is related with the elasticity of the matching function 
(respect to v) by η = ξ – 1. Similarly, the transition probability from unemployed to employed is 
m(v, u)/u = m(v/u, 1) = θq(θ), an increasing function of θ
2. 
The  endogenous  variables  of  the  model  are  the  level  of  market  tightness  θ,  the  level  of 
reservation productivity R, the level of effort e and, in turn, labour productivity p and the level 
of unemployment u. In the next section we derive their steady-state values. 
 
3. Steady-state equilibrium 
In steady-state the choices of opening a vacancy and destroying a job for a firm and the level of 
effort for a worker are based on the asset values of the various conditions. Indeed, these asset 
values are close to Pissarides (2000), therefore not much time will be spent on their derivation. 
As said before, the crucial difference in this paper is the introduction of effort in the worker 
utility function, which formally does not change heavily the asset values, but it does change 
significantly the subsequent steady-state analysis. 
From the assumptions on vacancy cost, idiosyncratic component and firing costs, we have that 
the asset values of a vacancy and a filled job satisfy the Bellman equations   
                                                                                                                                   (1) 
                                  
  
                                                                                   (2) 
In (1) a firm has to pay the vacancy cost per unit of time – pc and with probability q(θ) matches 
with an unemployed worker, gives up the value of a vacancy V and gets the value of a filled job 
at the upper support of the price distribution J(  ). In steady-state vacancies are opened until all 
rents are exhausted. Therefore, the equilibrium zero-profit condition is 
                                                           
2 In the Appendix we show that all properties of q(θ) derive exclusively by the standard assumptions of the 
matching function. 7 
 
                                
  
                                                                                                                  (3) 
In (2), conditional on the idiosyncratic component, a firm enjoys the value of product px and 
pay the wage w(x), then with probability λ a shock arrives and a new level of x is drawn from 
the price distribution G(x). In this case the firm has to give up the value J(x) and gets the new 
value J(s) if s is over the reservation productivity R, or destroys the job and pay pF otherwise. 
Similarly, from the assumptions on unemployment compensation (or leisure) and instantaneous 
utility function, the asset values of unemployed and employed worker solve 
                                                                                                                                   (4)   
                
 
                    
  
                                                                        (5) 
In (4) an unemployed worker enjoys the unemployment compensation z and with probability 
θq(θ) matches with a vacant job, gives up the value U and gets the value of employed at the 
upper support of the price distribution W(  ). In (5), conditional on the idiosyncratic component, 
an employed worker enjoys the wage w(x) but suffers the effort exerted   
 
    , then with 
probability λ a shock arrives and a new level of x is drawn from the price distribution G(x). In 
this case the worker has to give up the value W(x) and gets the new value W(s) if s is over the 
reservation productivity R, or the value of unemployed U otherwise. Furthermore, the choice of 
the effort level is one of rationale expectations, that is, e is the effort that maximizes the asset 
value of being employed. 
Wages are split so that workers receive a fraction β of the total match surplus and are revised 
whenever a productivity shock occurs. However, with the presence of firing costs the match 
surplus of a new job is different from that of an existing job, because only in the second case 
firms save the firing costs for the continuation of the match. Thus, we have to distinguish 
between the outside w0 and the inside wage w(x).  In the case of a new job the match surplus is 
                                  
and the sharing rule implies  
                                                                                                                               (6) 8 
 
Using the relation p = e, the zero-profit condition (3), the asset equations for a filled job (2), 
unemployed (4) and employed worker (5) and the sharing rule (6), gives the outside wage 
equation (see the Appendix for the derivation) 
                  
 
                                                                                                     (7) 
Differently, in the case of an existing job a firm saves the firing costs for the continuation of the 
match and thus the match surplus is different 
                                    
and the sharing rule implies  
                                             
Similar calculation gives the inside wage equation 
                    
 
                                                                                                 (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) differ only for the impact of firing costs F and this difference indeed 
emphasizes  the  conflict  between  insiders  and  outsiders.  On  one  hand,  inside  a  match  the 
prospect of paying F leads firms to concede marginally a higher wage to avoid the destruction 
of job. On the other hand, outside the match the expectation of paying F sooner or later once a 
job is created leads firms to start the match with a lower wage to partially recoup the future 
payment. As (7) shows, the impact of F on the outside wage is higher when λ is higher, because 
the probability of job destruction per unit of time is greater. 
The choice of destroying a job is taken inside a match, therefore we have to use the inside wage 
equation to derive the job destruction condition. Substituting (8) in (2), we get a more explicit 
expression of the asset value of a filled job as a function of the idiosyncratic component 
                              
 
                                  
  
                            (9) 
From (9) we can see that the asset value J(x) is a monotonically increasing function of x, which 
means that there exists a unique value x* such that J(x*) = 0 and for any x greater (smaller) 
than x*, then  J(x) > 0  (J(x)  < 0).  In the model  without firing  costs,  this  implies  that the 
reservation productivity R under which a firm destroys the job satisfies the reservation property 
J(R) = 0. In the model with firing costs, for a firm is optimal to continue even a negative 
match, as soon as the negative surplus is smaller than the cost of destroying a job pF. That is, 9 
 
with firing costs the reservation property is J(R) = – pF (or W(R) = U), which allows us to 
characterize the reservation productivity R. Subtracting the generic asset equation (9) from the 
equation evaluated at x = R and using J(R) = – pF, we get 
                              
 
                                  
  
                          (10) 
                                        
      
           
                                                                                                                                 (11) 
Now, substituting (11) in the integral expression of (10) and dividing by (1 – β)p, we get an 
implicit expression for R as a function of market tightness θ, labour productivity p and the 
parameters of the model   
     
 
    
 
       
 
          
 
                  
  
                                                                 (12) 
Equation (12) is the first steady-state condition of the model and in what follow we will refer to 
this as the job destruction rule (JD), when we emphasize the relation between R and θ, or as the 
reservation equation (RE), when we emphasize the relation between R and p. The value of pR is 
the lowest acceptable price to continue a job. From (12), we can see that pR is less than the 
reservation wage           
 
        , which is the lowest acceptable wage for a worker. One 
reason standard in this literature is the presence of some labour hoarding, represented by the 
integral  expression.  Given  the  probability  that  x  might  change  in  the  future,  for  a  firm  is 
optimal to continue some currently negative match and wait for a higher price, in order to avoid 
the hiring cost. As intuitive, labour hoarding is increasing in the probability of a change λ. The 
second one is the presence of firing costs, which are paid by firms but not enjoyed by workers. 
The choice of creating a job is taken outside the match, therefore we have to use the outside 
wage  equation  and  evaluate  the  value  of  a  filled  job  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price 
distribution. Substituting (7) in (2), subtracting (10) and using J(R) = – pF, we get 
                                                           
       
            
                                                                                                                            (13) 
Now, inserting the zero-profit condition (3) in (13), we get an implicit expression for θ as a 
function of the reservation productivity R and the parameters of the model   10 
 
 
                
      
                                                                                                                           (14) 
Equation (14) is the second equilibrium condition and we will refer to this as the job creation 
condition (JC). The left hand side of (14) is the cost of a vacancy for the expected duration of a 
vacancy. The right hand side is the discounted additional surplus a firm gets from a new job. 
Therefore, this condition says that in equilibrium the expected hiring cost has to be equal to the 
expected gain from a new job. 
Equations (12) and (14) jointly determine R and θ, as illustrated in Figure 1. Let define (12) as 
               and (14) as             , where ω is the set of parameters. Then we have 
  
      
       
           
            
 
         
       
                                                                                                              (15) 
  
      
       
           
                 
 
                                                                                                                    (16)       
As (15) shows, the curve JD slopes up because a higher θ increases the probability of finding a 
job and, thus, the opportunity cost for a worker  
 
       , who now pretends a higher wage to 
accept a job and so more jobs are marginally destroyed. As (16) shows, the curve JC slopes 
down because a higher R increases the probability that a job is destroyed λG(R) and, in turn, 
reduces the expected gain from a new job           
   –  
      , so less vacancies are opened. 
 
  R                                                JD 
 
 
   
                                                  JC                                
 
                                                         θ 
Figure 1 
Steady-state reservation productivity and market tightness  11 
 
So far, the joint determination of R and θ has been done as in the previous literature for a given 
level of labour productivity p and, indeed, besides the different specification of the worker 
utility  function,  no  significant  novelty  are  introduced.  However,  in  our  model  labour 
productivity is not a parameter but an ulterior unknown. Following our interpretation of p as the 
behavioural component of productivity, we assumed that its level is determined by the level of 
effort e exerted by the employed worker and, in particular, that p = e. 
The choice of effort is rationally taken by worker when he matches with a vacant job, therefore 
in equilibrium e maximizes the value of being employed at the upper support of the price 
distribution W(  ). Since our equilibrium is one of rational expectations, when a worker takes 
this choice he actually knows the job destruction rule R and takes into account the impact on it. 
Moreover, given the choice of effort is taken individually, the single worker considers the 
impact on market tightness θ marginally negligible. From this, it can be easily seen that the 
same  effort  level  maximizes  the  asset  value  of  unemployment,  being  U  a  monotonically 
increasing function of W(  ) 
                                
The  maximization  of  W(  )  in  the  form  of  Bellman  equation  (5)  is  not  a  trivial  calculus. 
However, using p = e and the reservation property W(R) = U, equations (4) and (5) can be 
solved for the permanent income form as a function of R, θ, p and the parameters of the model 
(see the Appendix for the derivation) 
                                     
 
       
   
                                  
  
               (17) 
As intuitive, since there is a non-zero probability of a productivity shock and, all the more so, 
of being fired, the permanent income of an employed worker at the upper support of the price 
distribution is less than the instantaneous utility. This form (17) allows us to take the F.O.C. 
and characterize the equilibrium condition for labour productivity p 
       
  
      
         –       
 
                           
  
              
  
                                                   (18) 12 
 
Equation (18) represents the equilibrium condition for labour productivity p (or effort e)
3 and 
from now on will be called the productivity equation (PE) . From (18), we can notice that the 
optimal level  of  p  depends  on  R  and  θ,  but  from  (12)  and  (14)  only  RE  depends  on  p. 
Therefore,  for  any  level  of  market  tightness  θ,  PE  and  RE  jointly  determine  R  and  p,  as 
illustrated in Figure 2. The shape of these curves is a bit more complicated then JC and JD, but 
still intuitive. Let define equation (18) as               . Then we have 
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Figure 2 
Steady-state reservation productivity and labour productivity  
                                                           
3 At first sight, the S.O.C. for this maximization problem would depend on the value of parameters 
 
        
            
     
           
  
 





However, for a very large set of values, indeed all the plausible ones, numerical computations unequivocally 
show that the condition  
        
        is respected. 13 
 
From (19), labour productivity p has two opposite effects on optimal reservation productivity 
R, the disutility-wage effect and the production effect. On one hand, a higher p increases the 
disutility  of  worker  and  consequently  the  wage     
 
    ,  thus  more  jobs  are  marginally 
destroyed. On the other hand, a higher p increases the value of production      and partially 
compensates a lower x, leading to a fall in R. Nonetheless, because of the increasing marginal 
disutility of effort, we can establish that when p is low the effect on wage is small and the effect 
on  production  dominates,  whereas  when  p  is  high  the  disutility  increases  more  than 
proportionally and the effect on wage dominates. Therefore, RE has a standard u-shape, with a 
minimum in the point in which disutility-wage effect and production effect exactly compensate. 
Similarly, reservation productivity R affects labour productivity p for the continuation value 
effect. In fact, a marginal increase in R does not change the instantaneous utility of worker, but 
obviously it does change his continuation value. In particular, a higher R not only increases the 
probability of being fired          shortening the expected period of employment, but also 
decreases  the  probability  of  finding  a  job         ,  increasing  the  expected  period  of 
unemployment. Both these impacts affect negatively the continuation value and, therefore, the 
worker chooses p so as to address optimally its level, knowing that R is chosen optimally by 
firms through (12). This continuation value effect is included in the numerator of (20) and it is 
greater for R and p high, which implies that PE has a shape as in Fig. 2. 
The last equation of the model is the steady-state condition for unemployment, usually called 
the Beveridge curve. There are different ways to derive this condition, here we state it in terms 
of flows in and flows out unemployment. In equilibrium the number of workers who enter 
unemployment (1 – u)λG(R) equals the number of workers who leave unemployment uθq(θ), so 
the steady-state condition is 
    
     
                                                                                                                                                 (21) 
Equation (21) is the final condition of the model and implies that in equilibrium for any R and θ 
there is a unique unemployment rate u and, in turn, a unique number of vacant jobs v.  
The Beveridge curve is often drawn in vacancy-unemployment space by a downward sloping 
and convex curve. Indeed, as highlighted by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), in the matching 
model with endogenous job destruction the precise shape of the Beveridge curve is ambiguous. 
In particular, differentiation of (21) shows that there are two opposite effects 14 
 
  
       
       
            
                       
  
   
  
            
             
  
   
  
                 
     
   
                                                          (22)  
On  one  hand,  more  vacancies  increase  the  number  of  job  matches,  implying  a  lower 
unemployment rate, captured by the second term of the denominator of (22). On the other hand, 
more vacancies increase the number of jobs destroyed, implying a higher unemployment rate, 
the first term of the denominator. Since the empirical evidence seems to identify this form, it is 
common to assume that the matching effect is stronger than the destruction one and to draw the 
Beveridge curve as a downward sloping and convex curve. Moreover, numerical simulations of 
the model with the equilibrium values fairly always confirm the conventional shape. As usual, 
in Figure 3 we draw the Beveridge curve with a straight line through the origin, representing all 
the possible values for v and u compatible with the equilibrium market tightness θ.                 
 
  v                                                 
     JC 
 
   
                                                         BC                                                       
 
                                                         u 
Figure 3 
Steady-state unemployment and vacancies  
 
In conclusion, we are ready to define the rational expectations equilibrium of the model: 
 
Steady-state equilibrium – The rational expectation equilibrium is a quadruple (R*, θ*, p*, u*) 
that satisfies the job destruction condition (12), the job creation condition (14), the productivity 
equation (18) and the Beveridge curve (21) implied by the rational expectations behavior of 
individual firms and workers and by the matching technology.   15 
 
For  any  value  of  labour  productivity  p,  equations  (12)  and  (14)  determine  reservation 
productivity R and market tightness θ. Then, from all these equilibrium triple, equation (18) 
identifies the unique value of equilibrium productivity p, compatible with job creation and job 
destruction conditions. Finally, with knowledge of R and θ, from (21) there is a unique value of 
equilibrium unemployment u and, in turn, a unique value of v. 
To  avoid  to  weigh  down  the  content  of  the  paper,  here  we  do  not  address  rigorously  the 
analysis of the dynamics of the model out-of-steady-state, however some remarks are proper. 
The usual assumptions in this kind of analysis  are that firms are able to open up or close 
vacancies instantaneously and that wage can be renegotiated at any time; that is, vacancies and 
wage are jump variables. These assumptions ensure that the zero-profit condition from a new 
vacancy (3) and the sharing rule (8) hold out of equilibrium as well. Similarly, the natural 
assumptions to make for the other two unknowns of the model are that firms can shut down 
unprofitable jobs instantaneously and that workers exert the optimal level of effort at any time; 
that  is,  reservation  productivity  and  labour  productivity  are  jump  variables  as  well.  These 
assumptions imply that the reservation property (12) and the optimal productivity (18) hold 
both in and out of steady state. Differently, the dynamic behaviour of unemployment, governed 
by the job flows in and out, is anyhow constrained by the matching technology, which does not 
allow jumps in job creation. Therefore, unemployment is the unique sticky variable of the 
model, because of the friction in the job creation process due to the matching technology. 
Finally, from (12), (14) and (18) it can be easily seen that neither the job destruction condition, 
nor the job creation condition, nor the productivity equation, depends on sticky variables and so 
all these endogenous (R, θ, p) indeed do not exhibit transitional dynamics but must be on their 
steady  state  values  even  during  the  adjustments,  being  all  the  dynamics  discharged  on 
vacancies  and  unemployment.  Notice  that  market  tightness  is  still  a jump  variable  even  if 
unemployment is sticky, but this only because firms can adjust instantaneously the optimal 
vacancies during the transitional dynamics of unemployment. Therefore, with these premises it 
is natural to imagine the out-of-steady-state dynamics as a saddle path, with one stable root for 
unemployment and three unstable ones for the other endogenous
4. 
 
                                                           
4  A  much  more  rigorous  analysis  of  the  transitional  dynamics  in  this  kind  of  models  has  been  pursued  in 
Pissarides (1985 or 1990) and can be found also in Pissarides (1990). Nonetheless, here we follow the same line 
and arguments of Pissarides (2000). 16 
 
4. Qualitative analysis 
In this section we address the main question of the impact of EPL on steady-state and, in 
particular,  on  endogenous  labour  productivity.  However,  to  highlight  the  relevance  of  the 
extension  pursued  in  the  paper,  we  start  pre-emptively  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  F 
considering p a parameter and only subsequently we allow p to change. 
Indeed,  the  impact  of  firing  costs  on  job  creation  and  job  destruction,  considering  p  a 
parameter, retraces basically the analysis of Pissarides (2000). From (12) and (14) we have that 
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                                                                                                                     (24)       
As (23) and (24) show, firing costs reduce both R and θ. The impact on R is due to the fact that 
destroying a job is more costly, whereas the impact on θ is because, once a job is created, firm 
will pay sooner or later the firing costs and this reduces the expected profit from a new job. To 
get the equilibrium impact we need to consider the overall impact of F, so we differentiate (12) 
and (14) respectively as                         and                       and we get 
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                                                                                     (26)   
Therefore, in equilibrium firing costs reduce both job destruction and job creation. In particular, 
the equilibrium impact on job destruction (25) is even stronger than the initial impact (23) 
because higher firing costs reduce market tightness and in turn wage, so less jobs are destroyed 
marginally (see (15) and (24)). On the other hand, the equilibrium impact on job creation (26) 
is weaker than the initial impact (24) because firing costs increases the duration of jobs and this 
partially attenuates the loss of the expected profit due to F (see (16) and (23)). The equilibrium 
impact is illustrated in Figure 4, where higher F shifts JD down and JC left. As the diagram 
shows, job destruction decreases unambiguously whereas the effect on job creation would seem 
ambiguous, but we know from (26) that job creation decreases as well. 
 17 
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Figure 4 
Impact of firing costs on reservation productivity and market tightness (with p fixed) 
 
Because of the symmetric impact on job creation and job destruction, the impact of firing costs 
on unemployment in these models is usually ambiguous, as differentiation of (21) shows 
  
     
          
  
               
  
  
                          
The equilibrium impact is illustrated in Figure 5. Higher firing costs shift the Beveridge curve 
in  and  rotate  the  job  creation  line  clockwise,  therefore  the  impact  on  unemployment  is 
ambiguous, but vacancy decreases unambiguously. 
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Figure 5 
Impact of firing costs on unemployment and vacancies 18 
 
So far we considered p a parameter unaffected by firing costs and basically we get the same 
results of the previous literature without significant novelty. Nonetheless, in our model labour 
productivity  is  an  endogenous  object,  so  now  we  allow  p  to  respond  to  a  change  in  F. 
Intuitively, we expect that firing costs affect in some way labour productivity for different 
reasons. Firstly, as (7) and (8) show firing costs affect directly the actual and future wage. 
Moreover, they affect indirectly wage through the probability of finding a job        . Finally, 
they influence the probability of being fired         affecting the continuation value of (17).  
From (18) we have that the initial impact of firing costs on optimal productivity is null, that is 
  
      
       
            
 
     
     
           
 
    
 
  
          
The economic intuition of this result is that firing costs have a negative effect on the outside 
wage  and a positive one on the inside wage, so in  expectations these  two impacts  on the 
permanent income of a new worker compensate, as showed by (17). This interpretation is made 
evident by the difference between (17) and the permanent income of a worker inside a match 
                                           
 
       
   
                                  
  
        
where firing costs certainly have a positive effect on wage and, in turn, on labour productivity. 
Thus, all the effect of F on p is induced by the impact on the other endogenous. And in fact, as 
long as R and θ do not vary there is no change on the continuation value and the permanent 
income of a new worker, so there is no impact on labour productivity. To get the equilibrium 
impact we differentiate (18) as                              and we get the following: 
   
       
       
             
  
   
  
     
  
   
  
   
  
      
  
   
  
    
    
   
                                                                                           (27) 
 
Proposition 1 – A higher level of EPL reduces the equilibrium labour productivity through the 
impact on reservation productivity and market tightness
5.  
 
                                                           
5 At first sight, there might be an ambiguity on the denominator of (27). However, both graphical analysis and 
numerical computations with a large set of values, indeed the most plausible ones, unequivocally show that the 
(27) is negative. 19 
 
The economic intuition of this result is the following. As (12) shows, labour productivity has a 
negative  impact  on  reservation  productivity  through  the  production  effect,  therefore  in  the 
choice of the optimal p the production effect induces worker to choose marginally a higher p to 
shut down R. When we analyze the impact of firing costs on reservation productivity we can 
easily realise that the effect is of the same magnitude of the production effect. To see this point 
let multiply (12) for p and concentrate on the production effect and the firing costs effect, 
ignoring for a while the other elements   
                                                                                                                                         (28) 
As (28) shows, the production effect is partially substituted by the firing costs effect in lowering 
R and so a higher F, amplifying the relevance of the disutility effect, induces worker to choose 
marginally a lower p. Moreover, a higher F reduces θ and consequently both outside and inside 
wage, inducing worker to choose a lower p (see (24)). The equilibrium impact is illustrated in 
Figure 6, when a higher F shifts RE down and PE left.  
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Figure 6 
Impact of firing costs on reservation productivity and labour productivity  
 
Considering p an endogenous object leads us to reassess the equilibrium impact of F on job 
creation and job destruction. In particular, now we differentiate (12) and (14) respectively as 
                              and                               and we get 20 
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                                                                                     (30) 
where we can easily establish the following                 and                , that is: 
 
Proposition 2 – Compared to the standard equilibrium with p as a parameter of the model, in 
the equilibrium with endogenous labour productivity EPL reduces even more job destruction, 
but reduces less job creation. 
 
The economic intuition of this result is that, as we have seen before (28), the presence of a 
more stringent protection legislation reduces the role of the production effect and amplifies that 
of  the  disutility-wage  effect,  leading  to  a  lower  labour  productivity  which  decreases  both 
outside and inside wage and, in turn, the optimal reservation productivity. Consequently, lower 
job destruction increases the expected duration of job and partially attenuates the loss of the 
expected profit due to a more severe legislation, leading to a smaller reduction of job creation. 
The equilibrium impact on R and θ with endogenous labour productivity and the difference 
with p exogenous is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 
Impact of firing costs on reservation productivity and market tightness (with p endogenous) 21 
 
In  conclusion,  considering  p  an  endogenous  variable  changes  only  quantitatively  the 
equilibrium impact of F on job creation and job destruction, but not the direction. However, 
firstly the extension of the model with endogenous labour productivity should be important per 
sé, especially in the light of the recent empirical evidence on the impact of EPL on labour 
productivity. Moreover, as will be clear in the next section, considering p an endogenous is 
very much relevant for the quantitative exercise and, in particular, for the welfare analysis and 
policy implications not only concerning EPL, but also for all kinds of policy evaluation. 
 
5. Quantitative analysis 
In this section we attempt a rough calibration of the model to evaluate quantitatively the impact 
of firing costs on labour market performance, but also on some measure of aggregate welfare. 
As  usual  in  this  literature,  we  adopt  the  following  Cobb-Douglas  matching  function  with 
constant  returns  to  scale,  generally  the  specification  most  suited  to  match  the  data  on  job 
creation (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, for the UK; Blanchard and Diamond, 
1989, for the US) 
                 
The  distribution  of  the  idiosyncratic  component  of  productivity  is  taken  uniform  over  the 
support  [0,  1]
6, i.e.                                .  Following  the  literature,  the  baseline 
parameters reported in Table 1 are set so as to match some typical features of the empirical data 
(see e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). The parameters of the matching function are set as 
usual at A = 0.15 and α = 0.5, close to empirical estimates. The workers‟ bargaining power is 
set at β = 0.5 equal to the elasticity of the matching function, so as to get constrained efficiency 
at least in the economy without firing costs. To generate in the simulation reasonable job flows, 
the arrival rate of the idiosyncratic shock is set λ = 0.081 (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). 
  
                                                           
6  Usually  in  the  literature  (with  labour  productivity  exogenous)  the  idiosyncratic  component  is  an  additive 
component of total price and the distribution is taken uniform over       , whit   a negative number. However, 
the level of labour productivity is fixed so that the total price is quite everywhere positive (see e.g. Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1994, 1999a,b). In our model we make a preference for the interpretation of the idiosyncratic 
component  as  a  multiplicative  component  of  total  price  (see  Lilien,  1982;  Blanchard  and  Diamond,  1989; 
Pissarides, 2000), therefore we adopt a positive support for the distribution, so that the total price is always 




            Baseline parameters 
            A  α  β  Λ  r  z  c  γ  [   ]  
0.15  0.5  0.5  0.081  0.03  0.35  0.05  0.5  [0, 1] 
        
Similarly, the preference parameter governing the disutility of effort is set at γ = 0.5, which 
induces an increasing disutility of effort but generates very reasonable values of utility and 
labour productivity. Finally, in our simulation we consider a semester as the unit of time and, 
accordingly, we set the interest rate at r = 0.03 (see e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002).    
In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  firing  costs  on  labour  market  performance,  we  compute
7 
different equilibrium of the model with F varying from 0 to 4. This should cover a significant 
range, from the laissez–faire case to the substantial firing restrictions case, where firing costs 
are more than three times the semester wage (see e.g. for Italy Garibaldi, 2006). In Table 2 we 
report the equilibrium values of unemployment rate, job flows, labour productivity, reservation 
productivity, market tightness and unemployment spell duration for different levels of firing 
restrictions. 
Table 2 
        Impact of F on labour market equilibrium 
   U  JF  P  R  θ  ud  
F = 0  0.212  5.5  2.29  0.87  3.03  3.83 
F = 1  0.205  4.9  2.09  0.77  2.57  4.15 
F = 2  0.197  4.3  1.92  0.67  2.15  4.55 
F = 3  0.188  3.7  1.76  0.56  1.75  5.03 
F = 4  0.176  3.1  1.62  0.47  1.39  5.65 
         
First, we can see that more stringent firing restrictions reduce significantly the equilibrium 
labour productivity. In particular, a level of firing costs equal to two times the wage (F = 2) is 
enough to reduce labour productivity more than 10% respect to the laissez–faire case, whereas 
in the substantial firing restrictions case the reduction is even of the 30%. Similarly, firing 
costs reduce both reservation productivity and market tightness and, in turn, job flows. As we 
can see, job flows in the substantial firing restrictions case are less than 60% of those in the 
                                                           
7 Fix point algorithm written in Matlab available under request by the author.   23 
 
laissez–faire case. Nonetheless, as standard in these models (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1999a), the overall impact on unemployment is positive, because the impact on job destruction 
overcomes that on job creation. It is worth noting as the difference in the level of job flows 
between the economies with low firing costs (5.5 – 4.9) and those with high firing costs (3.7 – 
3.1), seems to match very reasonably the real data in the U.S., the quintessential frictionless 
country,  and  the  European  countries,  where  notoriously  firing  restrictions  are  consistent. 
Finally, mirror to the decrease on job creation, higher firing costs increase significantly the 
unemployment  spell  duration.  In  particular,  in  the  substantial  firing  restrictions  case  the 
unemployment duration increases more than 50% respect to the laissez–faire case. 
In Table 3 we show the equilibrium values of reservation productivity and market tightness in 
the model with p exogenous, along with the values for the complete specification. In the model 
with exogenous labour productivity, we set p at the equilibrium level get in the laissez–faire 
case (p = 2.29) and we do not allow p to respond to change in our policy tool F. In this way we 
make clear what happen to job creation and job destruction when we allow labour productivity 
to adjust optimally to change in firing costs. As we can see, this numerical exercise confirms 
exactly the result of the qualitative analysis (see (29), (30) and Figure 7). In particular, when 
we allow p to respond optimally to change in F, this leads to an even stronger reduction of the 
equilibrium  reservation  productivity,  but  to  a  smaller  reduction  of  the  equilibrium  market 
tightness. 
Table 3 
        Job creation and Job destruction with p fixed (p = 2.29) 
   R (p = 2.29)  θ (p = 2.29)  R  θ 
F = 0  0.87  3.03  0.87  3.03 
F = 1  0.78  2.08  0.77  2.57 
F = 2  0.69  1.26  0.67  2.15 
F = 3  0.61  0.59  0.56  1.75 
F = 4  0.53  0.11  0.47  1.39 
 
Finally, to assess the impact of firing costs on well-being of the economy, we compute the 
value of different measures of aggregate welfare from the laissez–faire to the substantial firing 
restrictions case. In particular, we consider two main measures of aggregate welfare, the first 
concerning the production net of recruiting costs (Y – RC), the second the utility of agents 24 
 
(AWF). Our consistent measures of production and aggregate utility in the economy are (see the 
Appendix for the derivation) 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                           (31) 
                                                                                           
                                                                                                                             (32) 
where              indicates the conditional expectation of x over the truncated distribution 
[R,  ], that is 
               
          
 
 
            
 
In Table 4 we report the equilibrium values of these two measures of aggregate welfare for 
different levels of firing restrictions. Along with these main measures, we report some other 
index of well-being in the economy, as the permanent income of unemployed and employed 
worker in different conditions. 
Table 4 
       
Impact of F on aggregate welfare 
   Y  Y – RC  rW(1)  rW(E(x))  rU  AWF 
F = 0  1.70  1.62  0.73  0.71  0.69  0.71 
F = 1  1.49  1.43  0.66  0.65  0.61  0.64 
F = 2  1.30  1.26  0.58  0.59  0.55  0.58 
F = 3  1.14  1.11  0.52  0.55  0.50  0.54 
F = 4  1.01  0.98  0.48  0.52  0.46  0.50 
  
As standard in the literature, firing restrictions reduce unambiguously all measures of aggregate 
welfare, regardless we think about well-being in terms of production or utility of agents
8. This 
is not surprising, since we know that under restriction α = β the laissez–faire economy gets the 
                                                           
8 For what concern the welfare measures in terms of utility we should remember that we have assumed that 
workers are risk neutral and impatient, which implies zero saving and full consumption. This is usually done in 
this literature to avoid to solve the consumption problem, so as we can work with the maximized Bellman 
equation to derive the steady-state equilibrium of the model. Nonetheless, to some extent such limitation should 
be taken in mind when we think about the policy implications of our results. 25 
 
constrained efficiency. More interesting is the size of the reduction of production. In particular, 
a middle level of firing restrictions is sufficient to yields a production lower than 25% respect 
to the laissez–faire case, whereas in the substantial firing restrictions case the production is 
lower than 40%. Indeed, despite the negative impact of EPL on aggregate welfare is well-
known (see e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002), such worrying reduction in production is not 
standard: 
 
Proposition 3 – Compared to the standard equilibrium with p as a parameter of the model, in 
the equilibrium with endogenous labour productivity EPL reduces even more the aggregate 
welfare,  regardless  we  consider  the  well-being  of  the  economy  in  terms  of  production  or 
aggregate utility. 
 
Nonetheless, hidden under this result there is exactly the negative impact of firing restrictions 
on labour productivity, which not only reduces the total production of the economy, but also 
the surplus from job matches and, therefore, the utility of agents. Unsurprisingly, the inclusion 
in the analysis of this element enriches the picture of our model and, certainly, tells us an 
alarming result we should worry about. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The  matching  model  studied  in  this  paper  has  revealed  that,  indeed,  the  level  of  labour 
productivity in the economy can be influenced by labour market policies usually implemented 
by governments. Stimulated by the recent empirical evidence, we have focused on EPL and 
have shown that a higher level of firing restrictions partially substitute high labour productivity 
in  reducing  job  destruction  and  this,  consequently,  brings  down  the  optimal  level  of 
productivity. Furthermore, the response of productivity to EPL reasonably affects the level of 
production and, in fact, numerical simulation of the model has shown that a higher level of 
firing costs induces a consistent reduction on production, beyond the standard reduction found 
in the literature. Moreover, despite the reduction on the disutility of effort, higher EPL reduce 
unambiguously  our  measures  of  aggregate  welfare  (AWF),  inducing  a  worsening  on  the       
well-being  of  both  employed  and  unemployed  workers.  Therefore,  in  the  light  of  the 26 
 
predominant role of labour productivity growth in driving the income growth in the last twenty 
years (OECD, 2003, 2007), the result of this paper bring in a further element in support of the 
consolidated voice of the literature for a reduction of EPL especially in European countries. 
To conclude, the extension of the endogenous labour productivity pursued in this paper allows 
us to rationalize within the already fruitful matching approach the well-established empirical 
evidence on the impact on EPL on labour productivity, which indeed assumes the appearance 
of a macro-stylized fact in the European economies and, thus, should be explained in a macro 
model of the labour market. On the other hand, the inclusion of the optimal workers‟ response 
to political tools should be a positive element for any other policy evaluations. In particular, 
including both optimal agents‟ responses and market outcomes, the matching approach might 
turn  out  to  be  an  ideal  framework  to  address  crucial  questions  usually  analyzed  in 


















Properties of the matching function 
 
Proof of  
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therefore, we have 
     
    < 0 because 0 <   < 1.                                                                             
 
Proof of  
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therefore, we have 
      
    > 0 because the matching function is increasing in both arguments.    
 
Proof of  η = ξ – 1. 
     
          
   
            
     
    
 
                                .                                               
 
Outside wage equation (7) 
 
The sharing rule implies that in equilibrium the outside wage solves 28 
 
                                           
which gives us 
        
      
                                                                                                                     (33) 
or 
                                                                                                                   (34) 
where we have used the equilibrium zero–profit condition (3). 
Similarly, the sharing rule states that inside a match in equilibrium has to hold 
                                            
which gives us 
       
      
                                                                                                               (35) 
From the asset value of a filled job (2) we have that 
                            
      




              
   
      
                                                                                                                            (36) 
where we have used (33) and (35). 
Similarly, from the asset value of employed worker (5) we have that 
                                      
 
                            
  
              
                                                                                                                              (37) 
where we have used the productivity relation p = e. 
Using (36) and (37) we have that 
                                                
 
             
and knowing that in equilibrium (34) has to hold, we have that the outside wage solves 29 
 
                     
 
                                                                                    (38) 
From the asset value of unemployed worker (4) we have that 
                                
 
                      
 
                                         (39) 
where we have used first (33) and then the zero–profit condition (3). 
Finally, we substitute (39) in (38) and get the outside wage equation (7) 
                  
 
                                                                                                 
Starting from the sharing rule inside a match, same calculation gives the inside equation (8). 
 
Worker permanent income at the upper support of the price distribution (17) 
 
There are different ways in which the permanent income equation (17) can be derived using the 
equilibrium  conditions,  here  we  show  one  of  these  which  allow  us  to  establish  different 
interesting relations. 
First from the asset value of unemployed worker (4) we have that 
    
 
          
     
                                                                                                               (40) 
From the asset value of employed worker (5) we have that 
                       
 
                    
  
                                                      (41) 
Evaluating (41) at the upper support of the price distribution and at the reservation productivity 
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                                                     (43) 
Now subtracting (43) from (42) and using the reservation property W(R) = U we get 
                                                   30 
 
                 
       
                                                                                                             (44) 
Substituting (40) in (44) we obtain 
                             
       
                                                                                        (45) 
Similarly, subtract (43) from (41) to get 
               
        
         
and now substitute (40) and use (45) to obtain 
                     
       
                                                                                                   (46) 
This expression is extremely interesting because establishes the relation between the permanent 
income of a new worker at the upper support of the price distribution and that of a generic 
employed worker. In particular, it says that when firing costs are low the permanent income of 
a generic worker is always lower than that of a new worker, being the difference due to the 
different  level  of  the  idiosyncratic  productivity.  However,  when  firing  costs  are  high  the 
advantage of being already inside a match, which leads to a higher wage (see (7) and (8)), 
overturns the relation in favour of the generic worker. Indeed, this is exactly what we observe 
with the numerical simulation of the model in Table 4. 
Finally, insert (46) in the integral expression of the asset value of a new worker to get 
              
 
                       
       
                  
  
                        
      
 
                          
   
                 
  
                                  
and now using (44) and substituting the outside wage equation (7) gives us (17) 
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Total production (31) and aggregate welfare function (32) 
 
In  equilibrium  there  are  (1  –  u)  producing  workers,  who  differ  only  for  the  level  of  the 
idiosyncratic  productivity  x.  Among  these  uθq(θ)  workers  are  in  the  first  period  of 
employment, therefore produce at the upper support of the price distribution   . Instead, the 
other (1 – u – uθq(θ)) workers were employed already the previous period and indeed their 
level of x is not the same for all of them. In particular, a fraction λ faced a productivity shock 
and changed the level of x in a new value between    and R, whereas the complement (1 – λ) 
maintained the same level of the previous period. In turn, among these old workers maintaining 
the level of x, a fraction uθq(θ) entered two period ago and therefore produce at the upper 
support of the price distribution   , whereas the others (1 – uθq(θ)) entered more than two 
period ago and indeed we should distinguish again between those who faced a productivity 
shock and those who not and so forth. Therefore, the total production is 
                                                                                
                    +               +        ………    
As intuitive, the precise computation of the level of idiosyncratic productivity of producing 
workers in steady state is troubling, due to the recursive computation. Nonetheless, given that 
our aim is to evaluate the impact of firing restrictions on total production, it would be harmless 
to make an assumption to simplify the computation which affects in the same way the value of 
production  between  the  laissez–faire  and  the  substantial  firing  restriction  case.  Obviously, 
more an employed worker is old higher is the probability that he faced a productivity shock and 
changed his level of x. For simplicity, in (31) we assume that all workers older than two periods 
faced a productivity shock. Therefore, our measure of total production is 
                                                                                
                    
which after some easy algebra gives us (31).                                                                                 
Moreover, to check if our assumption is really harmless for our purpose, we repeated a similar 
numerical exercise of Table 4 when we derived the total production assuming that all workers 
older than three periods faced a productivity shock. In this case the total production is 32 
 
                                                                                
                    +               +                    
The conclusion was that as intuitive the value of production was slightly higher, but there was 
no difference on the impact of firing restrictions on total output, which led us to assess our 
assumption as innocuous for our purpose. 
Similarly, the aggregate welfare function is the weighted sum of utility of the different workers 
in steady state, knowing that the utility of worker depends on the idiosyncratic component of 
productivity.  Following  the  identical  argument  of  before,  in  equilibrium  there  are  u 
unemployed worker, uθq(θ) workers in the first period of employment enjoying the utility at 
the upper support of the price distribution   , (1 – u – uθq(θ)) old workers. Among these, a 
fraction  λ faced a productivity shock and enjoys the utility between    and R, whereas the 
complement (1 – λ) maintained the same utility of the previous period and, in particular, a 
fraction uθq(θ) entered two period ago and enjoys the utility at   , whereas the others (1 – 
uθq(θ)) entered more than two period ago and so forth. As the total production, in (32) we 
maintain the assumption that all workers older than two periods faced a productivity shock. 
Therefore, the aggregate welfare function is 
                                                                      
               +                    
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